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NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2018. Pp 512. 
In the 1990s Canada was involved in three major operations in 
Kosovo. The first was Operation Kimono from October 1998 to 
March 1999 as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). 
The purpose of the KVM was to monitor the cease fire by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and prevent further human rights 
abuses towards Kosovo’s Albanian population. Operation Kimono 
ended in March 1999 when human rights abuses continued despite 
the KVM’s presence. Canada’s second major involvement in 
Kosovo was through Operation Allied Force, a seventy-eight-day 
air campaign from 24 March 1999 to 10 June 1999 against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia intended to force them to withdraw 
from Kosovo and create peace in the region. The final major 
involvement was Operation Kinetic between June 1999 and June 
2000. Operation Kinetic was Canada’s contribution to NATO’s 
peacekeeping force, Kosovo Force (KFOR), which operated inside 
of Kosovo when the bombing campaign ended. In Operation 
Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo, military historian Sean Maloney aims 
to tell the story of Canada’s third and final major involvement 
and mission in Kosovo as well as Canada’s contribution to the 
overall stabilisation of Kosovo. It is meant to be an in-depth 
examination of how the international community transitioned 
from a small observer force, the KVM, to KFOR. However, the 
book does not deal with Canada’s role in Operation Allied Force 
(NATO’s seventy-eight-day air campaign). This sets Operation 
Kinetic apart from other books on the Kosovo War.
Operation Kinetic comes in three parts. The first part, 
“Background,” gives a “quick and dirty” primer on the Balkans 
and tells the history of Kosovo starting in 1389 (p. 1). The aim 
of this section is to help the reader understand the complexity of 
Kosovo and the cause of Canada’s involvement. Part two, “Crisis in 
Kosovo,” analyses the events and human rights abuses that led to 
the international community’s involvement in Kosovo. The final part, 
“Canada and KFOR Operations,” explains the operational context, 
the tactical activities and, most importantly, the challenges faced by 
the Canadian Forces. 
In Operation Kinetic Maloney is highly critical of a number of 
actors involved in the Kosovo War and the post-war stabilisation of 
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Kosovo. On the failure of diplomatic negotiations to avoid war at the 
Rambouillet Conference he asserts, “In the end the Kosovar Albanian 
delegation remained as intransigent as the FRY [Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia] delegation” (p. 82). But the Kosovar Albanian delegation 
signed the agreement presented and the FRY delegation did not. In 
addition, Maloney refers to Canadian bureaucrats as “fear-filled” and 
“skittish” (p. 374). Not surprisingly, he uses testimonies of soldiers 
who are highly critical of bureaucrats, but he rarely attempts to offer 
the historical and political context and there is no indication that 
he tried to interview any of those he is critical of. Maloney also 
criticises the Americans’ “serious confusion” about ground troops, 
and attributes their mixed messages to an attempt to “contain 
Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and Monica Lewinsky all at 
the same time” (p. 64). He is highly critical of the media’s coverage of 
the air war explaining that, “the war of perceptions and the air war 
became indistinguishable, as commentators dissected the voice and 
word usage of NATO spokespersons, attempted to decipher hidden 
subliminal messages and facilitated Belgrade’s attempts to distort 
reality for their purposes” [emphasis added] (p. 102). According to 
Maloney, while the media was busy exaggerating the “miniscule” 
number of collateral casualties from the air campaign, they were 
neglecting to report on the buildup of KFOR. He concludes, “the 
pessimism of the media commentators, however, could not compete 
with the resolve and grim professional determination that resonated 
throughout the NATO forces” (p.103). Again, there is no evidence of 
any attempt by Maloney to present the media’s perspective or the 
reasoning for their coverage. A recently published book by Canadian 
historian Bob Bergen, Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and 
Censorship During the Kosovo War, challenges Maloney’s assertion 
that the media alone was to blame for the lack of transparency during 
the Kosovo War by explaining that despite attempts of journalists to 
cover the Kosovo War fairly, their efforts were thwarted by restrictive 
media policies of both NATO and the Canadian government.1
Maloney can be considered a “straight shooter,” but his biggest 
problem is shooting at the wrong target. This is most evident when 
he deals with the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK), also known 
as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Maloney repeatedly accuses 
1  Bob Bergen, Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship During the 
Kosovo War (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2019). 
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the KLA of having connections, of all sorts, with al Qaeda and other 
Islamic extremists. He states, “The lure of weapons training proved 
too great for some young Kosovar Albanians, and a number made their 
way to Taliban-dominated Afghanistan to train with the al Qaeda 
terror network run by Osama bin Laden” (p. 41). The sole source for 
this accusation is a confidential interview. While it is not uncommon 
to use confidential interviews, other sources discredit Maloney’s 
claim, most notably Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and 
U.S. Intervention by David Phillips, a former diplomat and one of 
the leading American experts on Kosovo. As Phillips explains, 
Serbian propaganda tried to discredit the KLA by fabricating links to 
Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists. Media reports surfaced that 
the KLA was being trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and that 
Al Qaeda was providing funds. It is correct that Al Qaeda established 
a network of charities in Albania...an Egyptian national did, in fact, 
approach the KLA offering money and weapons on behalf of Al Qaeda; 
however, the envoy was rebuffed. The KLA’s war of liberation was not 
about religion. Foreign fighters saw Kosovo as an opportunity for holy 
war, but Albanians were engaged in a struggle for national liberation.2
Thus, while Maloney criticises the media for facilitating Belgrade’s 
attempts to distort reality for its own purposes, evidence suggests 
he may be falling into the same trap twenty years later. As proof of 
this, Maloney uses the instructions that came from Western nations 
that individual advisors and freedom fighters from other states 
should be withdrawn from Kosovo within thirty days. “It was time 
for the mujaheddin to go home,” he says (p. 137). However, this is 
more likely referring to Albanians from other countries who went to 
Kosovo to fight in hopes of liberating their home country, such as the 
“Atlantic Brigade” which consisted of fire fighters from the Bronx. 
Phillips acknowledges that in 1998, twenty-two mujaheddin showed 
up wanting to join the KLA. However, he explains that they were 
largely wiped out in an accident before making it into Kosovo.3 It is 
important to note, that some of the soldiers interviewed for Operation 
Kinetic refer to the mujahedeen as well. This is unsurprising since, 
2  David L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S Intervention 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2012), 70.
3  Phillips, Liberating Kosovo.
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as has been acknowledged, this was a concern in both the media 
and intelligence at the time. However, it is the responsibility of the 
historian to both present memories and put them into historical 
context, enlightening the facts. 
In the third part of the book, Maloney is in his element when 
writing about the details of Operation Kinetic and the structure of 
the Canadian military. He illustrates the difficulties the Canadian 
units overcame to become instrumental in preventing violence and 
stabilising post-war Kosovo despite not being given their own sector. 
The biggest strength of this book is the depth, vulnerability and 
candidness of the recollections Maloney is able to obtain from his 
interviewees. Soldiers reflect candidly on their fears: “it was quite 
scary, especially at night. We had NVGs [night vision goggles], 
but you can’t see jack shit” (p. 180); their triumphs: “it was like a 
World War II movie, the Canadians going through Holland. It was a 
terrific send-off” (p. 164), and their frustrations: “minute by minute 
management by Ottawa [is] frustrating - call it tyranny of real time” 
(p. 245). Soldiers also reflect on the toll of digging up mass graves, 
working near hazardous material and working with so many other 
countries, including Russia. 
In his acknowledgments, Maloney laments that after the events 
of 11 September 2001 and the wars that followed, “the Balkans had 
seemingly become irrelevant, and publishers made that point clear” 
(p. xvi). Though the blame does not lie solely with the publishers, 
it is an unfortunate reality that Maloney’s assessment is right. 
Unlike many historians, Maloney attempts to present adequate 
historical background of Kosovo. However, this commendable effort is 
complicated by the inaccuracies. It is when Maloney is in his element, 
describing military operations, technologies and eliciting testimony 
from soldiers that Operation Kinetic is the most useful.  Despite some 
setbacks, Operation Kinetic still represents a valuable contribution 
to the field of Canada/Kosovo relations and the Kosovo War. 
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